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Abstract. Man’s individual responsibility is a very central notion in Muslim theology. 
Rational foundations for moral responsibility presuppose, however, that man has in 
some way control over his actions. It was therefore of central concern to theologians to 
formulate theories of action that were coherent enough to account for human self-
determination. This article examines al-Bāqillānī’s reflections on human acts and 
attempts to contextualise his thought within the discussions of his time. I will briefly 
review the Muʿtazilites’ theory of freedom of action, against which the Ašʿarite school 
developed its own position. I will then outline the fundamentals of the opposing 
standpoint adopted by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī, who proposed to base human self-
determination on voluntariness. Finally, I will discuss how al-Bāqillānī drew on and 
further developed al-Ašʿarī’s ideas. Based on the extant volumes of al-Bāqillānī’s 
Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn, I argue that he attempts to coherently organise the school’s 
understanding of the famous theory of “acquisition” (kasb) by affirming two 
fundamental principles: a) that human acts are created by God and b) that there is 
nevertheless a real correlation between man and his “acquired” acts. 
 
Résumé. La responsabilité individuelle de l’homme est une notion centrale en 
théologie musulmane. Or une justification rationnelle de notre responsabilité morale 
présuppose que nos actes sont d’une certaine manière sous notre contrôle. Pour les 
théologiens, il était donc important de formuler une théorie de l’acte humain qui 
tienne compte de l’autodétermination humaine. Cet article analyse les réflexions d’al-
Bāqillānī sur le sujet de l’acte humain dans le contexte des discussions qui eurent lieu 
en son temps. Je récapitulerai brièvement la théorie muʿtazilite du libre arbitre, 
théorie à laquelle s’opposa l’école ašʿarite en formulant sa propre position. Ensuite, 
j’esquisserai les fondements du point de vue d’Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī qui proposa de 
baser l’autodétermination humaine sur la volontarité. Finalement, je discuterai 
comment al-Bāqillānī développe sa théorie en partant des idées d’al-Ašʿarī. Sur la 
base des volumes préservés de la Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn d’al-Bāqillānī, 
j’argumenterai qu’il envisage de donner plus de cohérence à la célèbre théorie 
d’“acquisition” (kasb) en soutenant deux principes: a) l’acte humain est créé par dieu; 
b) malgré cela, il existe une corrélation réelle entre l’homme et son acte “acquis”. 
 
 
It is a widely accepted idea that we are accountable for what we do. In 
Muslim thinking it is even deeply rooted in a worldview that is shared 
by the two other Abrahamic religions, where moral accountability is 
vitally linked to the belief in the Last Judgement. Man’s individual 
responsibility for his actions is consequently regarded as a crucial 
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feature of the relationship between God and His creation. It is however 
difficult to accept – and even more difficult to plausibly establish – 
individual responsibility for our doings without presupposing that our 
actions are determined by our very own self. Yet human self-
determination can be conceived in various forms. The mutakallimūn, 
that is, theologians who attempted to rationalize and systematically 
explain their doctrines, also developed different approaches to account 
for why our acting should be self-determined in some way.1 
 
 
I. SELF-DETERMINATION AS FREEDOM OF ACTION 
 
Many of us would intuitively affirm that moral responsibility is related 
to freedom of action: if we are individually accountable for what we 
do, we assume that we have control over our actions, and we think that 
it is up to us to decide whether and how we act. We then presuppose 
that morality is only possible if freedom of action is true. 
Essentially, this was also the prevailing consensus among 
Muʿtazilite theologians. For them, God’s justice was a fundamental 
pillar of their teaching and they believed that His judgement of man’s 
actions is founded on objective principles and values. Based on these 
assumptions, they argued that in no way does God create and determine 
human acts; for if we are accountable for what we do, if we justly 
deserve reward or punishment, we must be the originators of our acts 
and have the capacity to behave otherwise than we do.2 Accordingly, 
for the Muʿtazilites human self-determination implies that our acts 
causally depend upon us, and that the capacity by virtue of which we 
produce our acts is a power over alternatives: it enables us to perform 
 
1 As a general introduction to the free will problem, I found Thomas Pink, Free 
Will. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2004) very inspiring for my reflections 
on the issue of self-determination and responsibility as discussed in medieval 
kalām. 
2 The argument is discussed in detail by Daniel Gimaret, Théories de l’acte 
humain en théologie musulmane (Paris, 1980), pp. 252–7. With their belief in 
freedom of action, early Muʿtazilites were opposed to a number of proponents of 
divine determinism, most prominently represented by Ǧahm b. Ṣafwān 
(d. 128/745–6) and his followers, the so-called Ǧahmiyya. A critical examination 
of Ǧahm’s position was still a literary topos in the Muʿtazilites’ later writings: 
see, for example, ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār al-Hamaḏānī, al-Muġnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd 
wa-al-ʿadl, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī et al., 14 vols. (Cairo, 1961–1965), 
vol. VIII, pp. 3, 83; Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad Mānekdīm Šešdīw, Šarḥ al-uṣūl al-
ḫamsa, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUṯmān (Cairo, 1384/1965), p. 324; Abū Muḥammad 
al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad Ibn Mattawayh, Kitāb al-Maǧmūʿ fī al-Muḥīṭ bi-al-taklīf, ed. 
Jean Joseph Houben, Daniel Gimaret and Jan Peters, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1965–
1999), vol. I, p. 428. 
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two contrary acts and also allows us not to act at all (al-istiṭāʿa […] 
hiya qudra ʿalayhi wa-ʿalā ḍiddihi wa-hiya ġayr mūǧiba li-al-fiʿl).3 
While there was much agreement about man’s capability to causally 
determine his acts on account of his power (qudra), early Muʿtazilite 
theologians did not necessarily share a unanimous conception of what 
precisely is meant by human power.4 Another question they discussed 
was whether our acting can be explained on the sole basis of our 
capability to act or whether our freedom of action – that is, our 
autonomous choice between various possible options of behaving – 
depends on something else.5 
During the fourth/tenth century that primarily concerns us here, the 
Muʿtazila was no longer an intellectual endeavour of merely 
independent thinkers, but consisted rather of various well-established 
sub-schools. The predominant teaching was that of the School of Baṣra, 
which fundamentally relied on doctrines developed, structured and 
systematised by Abū ʿAlī al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 303/915) and his son Abū 
Hāšim (d. 321/933). The school’s theory of the human act is expounded 
in the works of one of its chief theologians, ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār al-
Hamaḏānī (d. 415/1025), and further detailed by a number of his 
students.6 In their teaching, human capability to act also fulfils a crucial 
purpose. By the notion of qudra – or more precisely, by its plural, 
qudar – they referred to entities (maʿānī) of “power” subsisting in the 
human body on account of which we are capable of acting. They 
maintained the fundamental principle, already formulated by the earlier 
Muʿtazilites, that our capability of acting in no way implies any 
necessity to act. Instead, it empowers us to choose between various 
alternatives: if we act, it is also our option whether to do the opposite or 
 
3  Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ašʿarī, Kitāb Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn wa-iḫtilāf 
al-muṣallīn, ed. Hellmut Ritter, 4th edn (Beirut, 2005), p. 230. 
4 For a study on some early conceptions of the qudra see Richard M. Frank, 
“Remarks on the early development of the kalam”, in Atti del III Congresso di 
Studi Arabi e Islamici (Naples, 1967), pp. 315–29. 
5 For example, theologians like Muʿammar b. ʿAbbād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830), al-
Ǧāḥiẓ (d. 255/869) and perhaps also Ṯumāma b. Ašras (d. 213/828–9) suggested, 
with some nuances, that the occurrence of bodily actions depend in some way on 
the human will (irāda) (see Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, pp. 28–35). The 
question, whether the Muʿtazilite conception of the human free agency is 
compatible with some form of determinism, was posed in its most radical form 
by Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (d. c. 200/815). According to him, human acts have two agents: 
God who creates and man who “acquires” the act. Most other Muʿtazilites 
disagreed with this theory to such extent that they even expelled him from the 
school; see also below. 
6 The most comprehensive and reliable analysis of ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār’s 
understanding of the human act is Richard M. Frank, “The autonomy of the 
human agent in the teaching of ʿAbd al-Ǧabbar [sic]”, Le Muséon, 92 (1982): 
323–55. 
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not to act at all. Any human action is consequently the agent’s 
autonomous decision and therefore determined by his very own self. 
They argued that this is firmly established by our common experience 
that we act in accordance with our intentions (qaṣd).7 
According to the Baṣran Muʿtazila, our intentional acts do, however, 
not occur by virtue of our will (irāda) or motivation (dāʿī). They even 
believed that the actual performance of our actions cannot depend on 
our motivations without violating the idea of our actions being free. 
They argued that if human actions were not solely grounded in one’s 
capability, but causally depended on something supplemental to one’s 
power – such as motivations –, man could no longer be considered as 
an autonomous agent.8 
In fact, the Baṣran Muʿtazilites developed a concept that rather 
appears to contradict the principle outlined above: they posited the 
existence of motivations that are so strong that the agent cannot but act 
 
7 Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, pp. 47–8, 56; Frank, “The autonomy of the 
human agent”, p. 327. In addition to the sources quoted by Gimaret and Frank, 
see also the relevant passages found in the part on istiṭāʿa from ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār’s 
Muġnī, which is missing in the Yemeni recension of the work, but now partially 
available in the Karaite recension (Nukat al-Kitāb al-Mughnī: A Recension of 
ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī’s (d. 415/1025) al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd 
wa-l-ʿadl: Al-Kalām fī l-tawlīd; al-Kalām fī l-istiṭāʿa; al-Kalām fī l-taklīf; al-
Kalām fī l-naẓar wa-l-maʿārif. The extant parts introduced and edited by Omar 
Hamdan and Sabine Schmidtke (Beirut, 2012), pp. 93, 107–11, 113–16). 
8  See Frank, “The autonomy of the human agent”, p. 327, relying on ʿAbd al-
Ǧabbār, Muġnī, vol. XI, p. 65 (kawn al-qādir qādiran yaqtaḍī fī fiʿlihi an yaṣiḥḥa 
an yūǧada fī ḥāl dūn ḥāl, wa-yuʾṯira fiʿlan ʿalā fiʿl min ġayr ʿilla, li-annahu law 
lam yafʿala ḏālika illā li-ʿilla la-naqaḍa ḏālika kawnahu qādiran), and p. 95 (lā 
yaṣiḥḥu taʿlīl al-ḥādiṯ min ǧihat al-qādir bi-mā yaqtaḍī iḫrāǧahu min kawnihi 
qādiran). The question, why the will cannot be the cause (mūǧib, ʿilla, sabab) for 
man’s actions, is comprehensively discussed by Abū Rašīd Saʿīd b. Muḥammad 
b. Saʿīd al-Nīsābūrī, al-Masāʾil fī al-ḫilāf bayn al-Baṣriyyīn wa-al-Baġdādiyyīn, 
ed. Maʿn Ziyāda and Riḍwān al-Sayyid (Beirut, 1979), pp. 357–61 and Abū 
Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad Ibn Mattawayh, al-Taḏkira fī aḥkām al-ǧawāhir 
wa-al-aʿrāḍ, ed. Daniel Gimaret, 2 vols. (Cairo, 2009), vol. II, pp. 560–2. The 
Baṣran Muʿtazilites did, however, not completely deny that one’s will and 
motivations are in some way effective. Rather, they posited that, depending on 
our intentions, our acts occur “in a specific manner” (ʿalā waǧhin): speech can, 
for example, have different modalities, and be uttered as a command, a statement 
or a question. In addition, the Baṣran Muʿtazilites believed that our will and 
motivations may have ethical implications: for example, whenever speech is 
uttered as a lie, the specific manner in which the act of speaking occurs is the 
effect of reprehensible intentions and therefore deserves blame. For the Baṣran 
theory of the effectiveness of the will and of motivations see Frank, “The 
autonomy of the human agent”, pp. 331–7 and, in particular with regard to the 
ethical dimensions of the issue, Sophia Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their 
Deserts. The Character of Muʿtazilite Ethics (Princeton, 2008) (see especially 
p. 141 for the modalities of speech). 
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in a certain way. In the technical language, they framed this idea with 
the term ilǧāʾ. 9  The actual purpose behind the Baṣran theory was, 
however, that motivations account for why some actions are more 
likely or more reasonable to expect (awlā) than others. 10  In other 
words, motivations are the condition for our doing something 
deliberately and not just randomly.11 The notion of ilǧāʾ does therefore 
imply a fairly high degree of likelihood but no necessity. However, our 
acts do not need to be purposive: according to the Baṣran School, they 
can even lack any rational foundation and consequently be pointless 
(ʿabaṯ).12 
Finally, the Baṣran Muʿtazilites even posited that our autonomous 
acts can be entirely non-voluntary: they argued that a sleeping or 
unconscious man still determines what he does. According to them, we 
must be in a state of awareness and consciousness whenever we 
generate motivations. Referring to the sleeper and the unconscious, 
they could then explain that this is not always the case with human 
agents, and so conclude that the actual performance of our acts cannot 
depend on the presence of motivations.13 The upshot of this theory was 
that, according to the Baṣran School, we can self-determine our 
behaviour through exercising freedom of action without deliberation. 
For them, freedom of action is consequently even possible without 
voluntariness. 
The Baṣran Muʿtazilite theory was not uncontroversial and posed a 
fundamental question: if freedom of action means that we have various 
alternatives of action, and if it is true that these alternatives are possible 
and become actual only by virtue of our power to act, would this not 
lead to the inconceivable conclusion that two contrary acts occur at the 
same time? The objection was not only raised by such detractors as 
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935), the founder of the Ašʿarite school, 
and his follower Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013),14 but was also 
 
9 The notion of ilǧāʾ was actually interpreted by Gimaret as a form of determinism 
that is incompatible with human free will (see Daniel Gimaret, “La notion 
d’‘impulsion irrésistible’ (ilǧâʾ) dans l’éthique muʿtazilite”, Journal Asiatique, 
259 (1971): 25–62; Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, pp. 48–9, 56–9). Frank, 
‘The autonomy of the human agent’ and Wilferd Madelung, “The late Muʿtazila 
and determinism: the philosophers’ trap”, in Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti and 
Lucia Rostangno (eds.), Yād-Nāma in memoria di Alessandro Bausani, 2 vols. 
(Rome, 1991), vol. I, pp. 245–57, pp. 245–8, showed that Gimaret 
misunderstands the Baṣran theory. 
10 Frank, “The autonomy of the human agent”, p. 348. 
11 Ibid., pp. 353–4. 
12 Ibid., p. 351; Madelung, “Late Muʿtazila and determinism”, p. 246. 
13 Madelung, “Late Muʿtazila and determinism”, p. 246. 
14 See Daniel Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ashʿarī (Paris, 1990), pp. 137, 145 and al-
Bāqillānī, Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn, MS Fes, Qarawiyyīn 692, fols. 143b–144a. 
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identified as a serious problem by a number of Muʿtazilite theologians. 
These critics from inside the Muʿtazilite school therefore pointed out 
that freedom of action actually presupposes voluntariness. For example, 
Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balḫī (d. 319/931), who was the head of the 
Muʿtazila of Baghdad and opposed his contemporary Abū ʿAlī al-
Ǧubbāʾī in a number of theological issues, is said to have affirmed that 
the occurrence of our actions depends on our will in that our will 
causes our acts to happen.15 We have no sources that provide us with 
further details how he supported his theory. Yet some other Muʿtazilites 
adopted a similar standpoint, including ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār’s student Abū 
al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 426/1044) and his later follower Rukn al-Dīn 
Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), whose teaching has survived in several 
important theological works. 
As we are told by Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Abū al-Ḥusayn posited that 
acting is impossible without motivation. He supported his theory by 
referring precisely to the quandary of man’s capability equally to 
produce two contrary acts. Human power, he argued, makes two 
opposite acts possible to exactly the same degree. This principle was 
the foundation of the Muʿtazilite belief in freedom of action. If our 
capability favoured alternative A over alternative B, our freedom of 
action would be seriously threatened. Yet only one possibility can be 
actualised, and so Abū al-Ḥusayn concludes that something else is 
needed for us to exercise our freedom of choice – something that 
accounts for why either possible action happens. Abū al-Ḥusayn 
identifies this something with the agent’s motivation (dāʿī) for the act 
of his choice or – in the case of various conflicting motivations – the 
preponderant motivation (taraǧǧuḥ). Against his teacher ʿAbd al-
Ǧabbār, he maintained that this is even true for the sleeper and the 
unaware: although their actions do not follow the same logic as if they 
were conscious, what they do is still coherent within their actual 
experience – such as their dreams – and has therefore a purpose. We 
might forget our motivations once we regain consciousness, we might 
even act under false assumptions and, as a result, fail to achieve an 
outcome we actually intended by our actions – in any case, however, 
the occurrence of our acts depends on the presence of at least one 
motivation to do what we do, irrespective of how it comes about.16 
Abū al-Ḥusayn’s claim for the need for motivations also affected his 
conception of the agent (fāʿil). According to the definition found in 
Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla, the agent causes his acts in a way that is not 
necessarily effective (al-muʾaṯṯir ʿalā ṭarīq al-ṣiḥḥa). Essentially, this is 
 
15 Abū Rašīd al-Nīsābūrī, al-Masāʾil fī al-ḫilāf, p. 357; Ibn Mattawayh, Taḏkira, 
vol. II, p. 561. 
16 Madelung, “Late Muʿtazila and determinism”, pp. 249–52. 
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the Muʿtazilite principle outlined above expressed in other words. What 
distinguishes Abū al-Ḥusayn’s conception is how he explains the non-
necessity of what we do. For him, being not necessarily effective means 
to make an effect take place according to one’s abilities and 
motivations. However, if we affirm that the occurrence of our actions 
does not depend on our being motivated to do them, we have to 
concede the possibility that agents do not cause things to happen in 
accordance with their motivations. Yet, Abū al-Ḥusayn concludes, this 
would corrupt the agent’s very being.17 
Abū al-Ḥusayn’s discussion of the real nature of the agent is found 
in the context of the question whether God has power (qādir) to do evil. 
The issue was highly controversial, not only between different 
theological strands, but also within the Muʿtazilite school itself, since it 
touched upon the veracity of two fundamental doctrines: the principles 
that God is almighty and that He is good. Abū al-Ḥusayn’s solution to 
the problem reveals much about his understanding of free agency and 
the process of decision-making involved. He affirms that God actually 
has the capability to do evil, thereby doing justice to His all-
encompassing power. Nonetheless, he says, it is impossible that God 
turn His ability to do evil into real action. The reason behind this is His 
reluctance and lack of motivations to do so (min qibali al-ṣawārif wa-
intifāʾ al-dawāʿī).18  This is indeed consistent with Abū al-Ḥusayn’s 
analysis of what it means to be capable: namely that one has the ability 
not only to act but also to omit the act.19 
Abū al-Ḥusayn compares the function of motivations with our need 
to have tools at our disposal allowing us the performance of certain 
acts: we need a needle to sew and a pen to write. Even if we have the 
ability to sew and to write, it is not possible for us to do so (lā yaḥṣulu 
 
17 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla. The extant parts introduced and 
edited by Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke (Wiesbaden, 2006), p. 97: 
“al-fāʿil huwa al-muʾaṯṯir ʿalā ṭarīq al-ṣiḥḥa, wa-maʿnā al-muʾaṯṯir ʿalā ṭarīq al-
ṣiḥḥa huwa allaḏī ḥaṣṣala al-taʾṯīr bi-ḥasab tamakkunihi wa-dawāʿīhi, fa-al-
qawl bi-anna al-fiʿl yaḥṣulu maʿ faqd al-dawāʿī wa-wuǧūd al-ṣawārif wa-
yakūnu man laysa lahu ilayhi dāʿin fāʿilan yaqtaḍī ṯubūt fāʿil lam yuḥaṣṣil al-
taʾṯīr bi-ḥasab dāʿīhi, fa-tantaqiḍu ḥaqīqat al-fāʿil wa-nulabbisuhu bi-man laysa 
bi-fāʿil”. Abū al-Ḥusayn goes on arguing that this must even be admitted by his 
Baṣran Muʿtazilite fellows who question his understanding of the agent: “fa-
ammā aṣḥābunā fa-innahum, wa-in lam yaǧʿalū hāḏā maʿnā al-fāʿil, fa-innahum 
yaqūlūna: al-fiʿl yaǧibu wuqūʿuhu bi-ḥasab dāʿī al-qādir wa-yaǧibu intifāʾuhu 
bi-ḥasab ṣārifihi, fa-iḏan wuqūʿuhu maʿ wuǧūd al-ṣawārif wa-intifāʾ al-dawāʿī 
muḥāl”. 
18 Ibid., p. 99. 
19 Ibid., p. 97: “al-qādir huwa allaḏī yaṣiḥḥu an yafʿala wa-an lā yafʿala”; whether 
one acts or omits the act depends, in accordance with his abovementioned 
theory, on motivations: “wa-maʿnā ḏālika huwa anna fiʿlahu yaḥṣulu bi-ḥasab 
dawāʿīhi wa-yaǧibu intifāʾuhu bi-ḥasab ṣawārifihi”. 
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maʿahu al-ṣiḥḥa) as long as we do not have access to these tools. The 
fact that we lack these tools, however, does not affect our ability in 
itself. In line with this idea, Abū al-Ḥusayn stresses the difference 
between stating that an act is impossible (yastaḥīlu) for somebody and 
that somebody has no capability to do it. Based on this assumption, he 
goes on arguing that, similarly, an agent who is capable of performing a 
certain act depends on his motivations. Yet in no way does this conflict 
with his actions being self-determined. Abū al-Ḥusayn supports this 
argument by comparing somebody capable of actions with somebody 
who is not (ʿāǧiz). Whoever is reluctant to do that which he is capable 
of doing will act once his motivations change. In contrast, it is not up to 
us to cause acts that are beyond our capacities, irrespective of whether 
we want them to occur or not.20 
In conclusion to this brief sketch of Muʿtazilite positions, it appears 
that their theologians agreed on basing human self-determination on 
freedom of action. Beyond this consensus, however, they proposed 
different explanations for why our actions should be free. In the 
fourth/tenth century, the Baṣran Muʿtazila represented a trend that 
identified freedom of action with a power over alternatives. For them, 
this capacity is sufficient for our actions to be free. Others pointed out 
that exercising freedom of action also depends on the agent’s decision-
making, something that is not implied by the mere capability to behave 
in different ways. They argued that free agency always requires 
intentionality, which accounts for why one of several possible acts 
happens. Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī followed this logic and therefore 
considered that our actions depend on motivations without which 
exercising freedom of action would be impossible. 
 
 
II. SELF-DETERMINATION AS VOLUNTARINESS 
 
1. Al-Ašʿarī: Moral Responsibility in the Absence of Freedom of Action 
 
Freedom of action was not only subject to internal debates between 
theologians who believed in that principle. The idea as such was highly 
controversial and categorically rejected by many opponents. The 
Muʿtazilites had, however, advanced a very clear explanation for why 
we have control over, and consequently are responsible for, our acts. 
Whoever wanted to question their theory on the same level of rational 
plausibility would therefore have to put forward an alternative 
conception of human self-determination. An important position against 
freedom of action was developed on the basis of the doctrines of Abū 
 
20 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla, pp. 99–100. 
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al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī, a former Muʿtazilite whose teaching laid the 
foundation for the Ašʿarite school of kalām. 
The point of departure for al-Ašʿarī’s reasonings on human acts was 
the doctrine of divine omnipotence. He claimed that God’s absolute 
power is in no way restricted: it encompasses every creation and so all 
happenings in the world, even those proceeding from others, must 
depend on Him. Were this not the case, God would have to be 
conceived as weak and powerless.21 
Al-Ašʿarī’s understanding of God’s omnipotence directly affected 
his conception of human acts. Since they belong to the temporal world, 
they must also be determined by God: in this sense, al-Ašʿarī posits, 
acts of disobedience are created and foreordained by God.22 Similarly, 
if piety was not created by God and the believer could also disbelieve, 
God would necessarily be unable to impose His power upon His 
creation, and this would in turn fundamentally violate the idea of His 
omnipotence. 23  Believers and unbelievers therefore act without any 
possibility for them to act differently: “If the unbeliever were capable 
of believing,” al-Ašʿarī says, “he would believe.”24 
Al-Ašʿarī consequently shared the Baṣran Muʿtazilites’ view that 
divine determinism is incompatible with human freedom of action. 
Departing from a common premise they arrived at diametrically 
opposed conclusions, however. Since the Muʿtazilites’ primary concern 
was not to violate the principle of God’s justice, they assumed that He 
refrains from exercising His omnipotence in the realm of human acts, 
thereby giving us full control over how we act. On the other hand, al-
Ašʿarī’s main preoccupation was God’s omnipotence, and so he argued 
that there is no creator (ḫāliq) and no agent (fāʿil) apart from God.25 
For him, the idea that everything occurs by the divine will means that 
human free agency cannot be true: according to his view, God alone 
creates our actions and so al-Ašʿarī denied that we have the capacity to 
 
21 See the critical edition and translation of al-Ašʿarī’s Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, §§49–53 in 
Richard J. McCarthy, The Theology of al-Ashʿarī. The Arabic text of al-
Ashʿarī’s Kitāb al-Lumaʿ and Risālat Istiḥsān al-Khawḍ fī ʿIlm al-Kalām, with 
brief annotated translations, and Appendices containing material pertinent to the 
study of al-Ashʿarī (Beirut, 1953) (in the following referred to as al-Ašʿarī, 
Lumaʿ). The upshot of this theory was a radical occasionalism: see Dominik 
Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, Occasionalismus. Theorien der Kausalität im 
arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken (Göttingen, 2000), pp. 51–6. 
22 Al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §101; see also Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 378–9. 
23 Al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §§57–58. 
24 Al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §135 (all English translations from the Lumaʿ are by 
McCarthy). 
25 Al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §87; see also Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, p. 80; 
Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 387–8. 
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act otherwise than we actually do.26  He consequently was what we 
would nowadays call a hard determinist. 
By adopting this line of reasoning, al-Ašʿarī inevitably faced a 
fundamental objection. As a former Muʿtazilite he knew all too well 
that determinism poses a serious threat to morality, since morality 
involves individual responsibility for our own actions. Therefore, what 
we are held responsible for must in some way be within our control. 
But how then could moral responsibility be true if, according to al-
Ašʿarī, it is not up to us whether or not we act as we do? In order to 
confirm the validity of determinism, he had to disprove the principal 
assumption that moral responsibility really depends on our actions 
being free. He therefore developed an alternative way of understanding 
human self-determination, a way which differs from its Muʿtazilite 
conception as free and genuine creation of our acts. 
Appealing to our experience, al-Ašʿarī argues that human actions are 
not all of the same kind. Common sense shows us that there is a 
difference between such motions as trembling and walking: we feel that 
our trembling occurs necessarily (iḍṭirāran), while this is not the case 
with our walking.27 These two motions are, however, not distinguished 
on account of who produces or initiates the act. Both have a temporal 
existence: they come into existence after their non-existence and at 
some point cease to exist. As previously outlined, their creator therefore 
cannot be other than God in al-Ašʿarī’s view. But what then 
distinguishes the “necessary” act from other acts? For al-Ašʿarī the 
necessity of our trembling involves our weakness (ʿaǧz). As a logical 
corollary, the opposite must be true for all non-necessary actions: they 
involve our power (qudra or quwwa). Such acts, which, in al-Ašʿarī’s 
words, “occur on account of a created power” (waqaʿa bi-quwwatin 
muḥdaṯa) are denoted as kasb or iktisāb, usually translated as 
“acquisition”.28 
Al-Ašʿarī was not the first to refer to human acts as kasb and iktisāb. 
Rather, he built on the ideas of earlier thinkers who tended to minimise 
or even completely deny a human capacity of creation. It is possible 
 
26 Al-Ašʿarī radically expresses his determinism in his discussion of the question 
who are the real “Qadarites” (al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §§120–121), where he 
concludes: “We affirm that God determines our works and creates them as 
determined for us, but we do not affirm that of ourselves.” 
27 As Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, p. 82, notes, the distinction between 
necessary and non-necessary acts was not made by such proponents of divine 
determinism as the Ǧahmiyya. 
28 Al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §§92–94; see also the definition in al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, p. 542: 
“wa-al-ḥaqq ʿindī anna maʿnā al-iktisāb huwa an yaqaʿa al-šayʾ bi-qudrain 
muḥdaṯa fa-yakuna kasban li-man waqaʿa bi-qudratihi” and Gimaret, Théories de 
l’acte humain, pp. 80–1; Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 131, 391. 
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that these theologians believed the appropriateness of this terminology 
was supported by its frequent occurrence in the Qurʾān, where the 
verbs kasaba, iktasaba and their maṣdars are used in the meaning of 
“to do” or “to perform an act”. More precisely, these terms are mainly 
employed when referring to us acting whilst being held accountable for 
fulfilling or neglecting obligations, duties and prohibitions imposed by 
God.29 In the theological context of describing and analysing human 
acts, the terms eventually appear to have been introduced into the 
technical vocabulary by Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (d. c. 200/815). He developed 
the theory that all our acts are created by God, while our role is 
restricted to “acquiring” them. This led him to the much-debated 
conclusion that every human act has two agents, namely God who 
produces the act and man who “acquires” it. Ḍirār’s theory was 
modified only a little later by al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Naǧǧār (d. c. 
220/835). Al-Naǧǧār also posited that we “acquire” acts created by 
God, but for him only man himself is the agent of any such actions. Ibn 
Kullāb (d. c. 240/854), who, in many respects, was a precursor of al-
Ašʿarī’s teaching, also used the term kasb, but we do not have a clear 
account of precisely how he employed it.30 
Al-Ašʿarī took these reflections as points of departure for his own 
theory. Being concerned to do justice to God as the all-encompassing 
creator, the terminology derived from the root k-s-b helped him to 
speak about human acts and, at the same time, to avoid asserting that 
these acts are brought into existence by man himself, as implied by 
such verbs as faʿala or – the even more controversial – ḫalaqa. In 
addition, the Qurʾānic connotation of kasb/iktisāb introduced the very 
central aspect of morality. This semantic nuance was crucial for al-
Ašʿarī’s theory, since for him, human beings are only responsible for 
“acquired” acts and not for “necessary” acts.31 
In order to properly understand al-Ašʿarī’s position, it still needs to 
be explained on what basis he holds us accountable for such acts, if it is 
not us who actually originate them. Although al-Ašʿarī’s extant writings 
do not directly answer this question, a passage from his Lumaʿ helps us 
 
29 See, for example Q 2:286, 3:161 or 24:11; there were even more economic 
interpretations of kasaba in such verses as Q 2:79 (see M. Schwarz, 
“ ‘Acquisition’ (kasb) in early Kalām”, in Samuel M. Stern, Albert Hourani and 
Vivian Brown (eds.), Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays 
presented by his friends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his 70. birthday 
(Oxford, 1972), pp. 355–87, pp. 361–2). 
30 Schwarz, “ ‘Acquisition’ (kasb) in early Kalām”, pp. 358–68. See also Josef van 
Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine 
Geschichte des religio sen Denkens im fru hen Islam, 6 vols. (Berlin/New York, 
1991–1997), vol. III, pp. 45–8 (for Ḍirār b. ʿAmr), vol. IV, pp. 149–50 (for al-
Naǧǧār) and vol. IV, p. 195 (for Ibn Kullāb). 
31 Schwarz, “ ‘Acquisition’ (kasb) in early Kalām”, pp. 373–7. 
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to make sense of his line of reasoning. In the following quotation, al-
Ašʿarī analyses the relation between our actions and our will: 
[W]hen an unwilled act of a man takes place, it must be the result of unmindfulness, or 
weakness and feebleness, or failure to attain his desire. […] That is so because the 
reason which enforces the man’s weakness and failure to attain his desire, when he 
knows what proceeds from him but does not will it, is that what he wills does not take 
place and that he did not will what does take place. For if what he wills takes place, he 
is not overtaken by weakness and feebleness; but if it does not take place, he is 
overtaken by feebleness and failure to attain his desire, because it proceeds from him 
while he knows it but does not will it.32 
The discussed scenario of somebody failing to do what he actually 
wants describes a pattern which is echoed in al-Ašʿarī’s portrayal of the 
“necessary” act. In this context, “necessity” (ḍarūra) is defined as:  
that to which the thing is constrained and compelled and forced, and from which it can 
find no way to get free or to escape, even though it strive to be freed from it and want 
(arāda!) to escape from it and exhaust its endeavors to do so.33 
It is true that in the above-quoted passages al-Ašʿarī does not refer in 
consistent terms to the “weakness” or “feebleness” that accounts for 
why we may act against our willing and wanting. Whereas in the first 
case he appeals to our “weakness” (ḍaʿf) and “feebleness” (wahn) to 
explain why in some cases we consciously do things that oppose our 
will, he denotes the “weakness” involved in “necessary” actions by the 
term ʿaǧz. Nonetheless, he obviously refers to the same circumstances 
of acting: despite terminological inconsistency, one could hardly 
consider how the act discussed in the first quotation should be 
perceived by its agent as a non-necessary act. Yet it is precisely on the 
basis of the agent’s individual experience of acting under compulsion 
that al-Ašʿarī establishes the “necessary” act as opposed to “acquired” 
acts. 
What al-Ašʿarī here suggests against the Muʿtazilites’ conception of 
self-determination as freedom looks consequently very much like 
basing morality and responsibility on voluntariness: whenever 
performing an “acquired” act, we act as morally responsible agents, 
because we do things according to our willing and wanting. On the 
other hand, we cannot blame people for actions they do on account of 
their weakness and against their willing and wanting them to happen. 
The Baṣran Muʿtazilite principle that freedom does not presuppose 
voluntariness is thereby turned upside down: for al-Ašʿarī we can act 
voluntarily without having freedom of action – i.e. without any 
possibility to act otherwise than we do. 
 
32 Al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §59. 
33 Al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §92. 
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The fundamental assumption that our actions can still be voluntary 
even if we cannot omit them might be far from straightforward and 
even be in apparent contradiction to our common thinking. That both 
ideas can be harmonised is, however, well illustrated by a famous 
example that helped the 17th-century philosopher John Locke to 
demonstrate that voluntariness and necessity are not opposed to each 
other. That example concerns a man who stays in a room of his own 
volition, while unbeknownst to him the door is locked. Although he is 
not able to do otherwise and leave the room, he is still acting according 
to his volition. Therefore, his staying in the room is, in this sense, a 
self-determined act exercised through voluntariness.34 
If we interpret al-Ašʿarī’s accounting for moral responsibility along 
this line of reasoning, we still face a number of unresolved questions. 
Most of these issues turn around the precise conception and function of 
our “power” (qudra) within his theory. Since for al-Ašʿarī all human 
acts are God’s creation, there is no causal connection but only 
conjunction between the qudra and the “acquired” act. But how do we 
then have to understand his definition of “acquired” acts as “that which 
occurs on account of a created power” (mā waqaʿa bi-qudratin 
muḥdaṯa)? What, in particular, is the meaning of the particle bi-, 
considering al-Ašʿarī’s denial that man is in any way capable of 
causing his own acts? If we perform “acquired” acts whenever our will 
conforms with how we act, what is al-Ašʿarī’s ontological conception 
of the will – and why does he rely on the concept of qudra at all?35 
We cannot be sure whether or not al-Ašʿarī ever addressed these 
questions. Even though they are not discussed in his extant writings, we 
have to bear in mind that the vast majority of his extensive work is 
missing while only a handful of treatises have survived. What we can 
reconstruct on the basis of some few original writings and the 
additional later accounts of his theology is therefore not a coherent 
theory. However, later representatives of al-Ašʿarī’s school took his 
thoughts as their point of departure for further analysis of human acts. I 
want to focus in the following on a third-generation Ašʿarite, Abū Bakr 
al-Bāqillānī, who can rightly be described as one of the major 
protagonists of the school’s scholastic consolidation. 
 
34 The basing of moral responsibility on voluntariness in the absence of freedom is 
also found in Western philosophy, a belief prominently represented by the 
sixteenth-century reformer John Calvin; see Thomas Pink, “Power and moral 
responsibility”, Philosophical Explorations, 12 (2009): 127–49, pp. 139–43 and, 
in a more popular form, Pink, Free Will, pp. 73–9. 
35 Essentially, these questions were already raised by Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 391–
6, who concludes that they can even not be satisfactorily answered on the basis 
of later Ašʿarite accounts – such as Ibn Fūrak’s Muǧarrad maqālāt al-Ašʿarī, our 
most important second-hand source on al-Ašʿarī’s theology. 
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2. Al-Bāqillānī: The Effectiveness of Human Power 
 
Essentially, two extant works of al-Bāqillānī’s theological writings 
provide us with substantial information as to how he drew on and 
further developed al-Ašʿarī’s theory of “acquired” acts. The first of 
these two works, the Kitāb al-Tamhīd, bears witness to al-Bāqillānī’s 
attempt to systematically compile and coherently organise the teachings 
of his predecessors.36 It has been convincingly argued that this book 
was in fact one of al-Bāqillānī’s early works, possibly written around 
360/970. 37  Our second source, which must have been one of al-
Bāqillānī’s last works, is his magnum opus in theology, Hidāyat al-
mustaršidīn.38 Within the four fragments that have survived from this 
multi-volume summa, we find substantial parts of the discussions 
related to human actions. 39  Al-Bāqillānī’s solutions of specific 
theological questions were not consistent throughout his life. It is in 
particular in the Hidāya that he looked for alternative approaches to 
such issues and thereby revised some of his earlier positions.40 Our 
particular interest in the Hidāya consists here in the fact that al-
Bāqillānī addresses a number of those abovementioned questions left 
unresolved in al-Ašʿarī’s theory of human action. Yet the 
 
36 See Heidrun Eichner, The Post-Avicennian Philosophical Tradition and Islamic 
Orthodoxy. Philosophical and Theological summae in Context (Unpublished 
“Habilitation”-Thesis, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 2009), 
pp. 160–4; through analysing the literary structure of the work, she concludes 
that “the K. al-Tamhīd marks a transgression between a comprehensive 
presentation of doxographical material and attempts to develop a theory of the 
systematical coherence of the doctrines expounded” (p. 160). 
37 Daniel Gimaret, “La théorie des aḥwâl d’Abû Hâšim al-Ǧubbâʾî d’après des 
sources ašʿarites”, Journal Asiatique, 258 (1970): 47–86, pp. 76–7; Gimaret, 
Théories de l’acte humain, p. 94–5; Daniel Gimaret, “Un extrait de la Hidāya 
d’Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī: le Kitāb at-tawallud, réfutation de la thèse muʿtazilite 
de la génération des actes”, Bulletin d’études orientales, 58 (2009): 259–313, 
p. 259 (with further references). 
38 The relative chronology can be established by two citations of the Tamhīd found 
in the Hidāya (see Gimaret, “Un extrait de la Hidāya d’Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī”, 
p. 265 and Sabine Schmidtke, “Early Ašʿarite theology. Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī 
(d. 403/1013) and his Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn”, Bulletin d’études orientales, 60 
[2011]: 39–71, p. 43). 
39 For the manuscripts and their content see Gimaret, “Un extrait de la Hidāya 
d’Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī” and Schmidtke, “Early Ašʿarite theology”. On the 
topic of the human act, al-Bāqillānī also wrote a Kitāb aḥkām taṣarruf al-ʿibād, 
quoted in the Hidāya (MS Fes, fol. 112b = Gimaret, “Un extrait de la Hidāya 
d’Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī”, p. 286, §67). 
40 A famous example is al-Bāqillānī’s adaption of the Muʿtazilite notion of ḥāl: 
after having completely rejected the concept in the Tamhīd, al-Bāqillānī 
eventually came to use it in the Hidāya; for further details see below. 
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incompleteness of the text and damages to the manuscripts41 sometimes 
make it difficult to reconstruct his position in its full details. 
Al-Ašʿarī’s starting point for explaining our responsibility for certain 
acts is also central to al-Bāqillānī’s approach: he adopts the distinction 
between “necessary” and “acquired” acts. Originally, the Hidāya 
contained a definition of the concept of “acquisition”, which is 
however lost and only referred to as occurring in a previous passage.42 
Anyway, the Tamhīd also includes a definition that draws on al-Ašʿarī’s 
theory whilst introducing a new idea. According to this definition, 
“acquisitions” are acts, which, in contrast to “necessary” acts, are 
performed by agents who possess a power in the substrate of and 
simultaneously with the act (taṣarruf fī al-fiʿl bi-qudratin tuqārinuhu fī 
al-maḥall).43 This is merely a reformulation of al-Ašʿarī’s view. But 
what is particular about al-Bāqillānī’s approach is that, apparently for 
the first time in the Ašʿarite literature, he ties the notion of 
“acquisition” to the agent’s choice (iḫtiyār) and also once to the agent’s 
intention or purpose (qaṣd). 44  Al-Bāqillānī’s claim that power over 
“acquired” acts involves the agent’s choice of this particular act is also 
repeated in the Hidāya as part of his extensive refutation of the so-
called theory of tawallud, that is the idea that human beings have 
capability of acting outside their own body through causal chains: 
[T]he “acquisition” is distinguished from the “necessary” [act] by virtue of the fact that 
power over [the act] subsists [in the agent] and that he in whom [the power] subsists is 
capable of [acting] and choosing it.45 
Al-Ašʿarī’s original assumption that our moral accountability does 
not depend on freedom of action being true is consequently followed 
up by al-Bāqillānī. Suppose I choose to walk from A to B and act 
 
41 In particular, the beginning and the end of MS Fes are affected by damages to 
the paper. 
42 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 9b: “[…] šaraḥnāhu min qablu fī ḥadd al-
kasb”. 
43 Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, Kitāb al-Tamhīd, ed. Richard 
M. McCarthy (Beirut, 1957), p. 307, §527; see also the definition in Abū Bakr 
Muḥammad Ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb wa-al-iršād (al-ṣaġīr), ed. 
ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1993–1998), vol. I, p. 233: 
“mā waqaʿa maqdūran lahu bi-qudratin muḥdaṯatin, wa-laysat qudratan ʿalā 
iḥdāṯihi wa-inšāʾihi”. 
44 See Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, p. 87, referring to al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 
pp. 308, §527 and 286, §486. Even before, the notion of iktisāb was apparently 
tied to the agent’s choice (iḫtiyār) by the Imāmī theologian Hišām b. al-Ḥakam 
(d. 179/795–6) (Schwarz, “ ‘Acquisition’ (kasb) in early Kalām”, p. 370). 
45 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 112b (edited as part of Gimaret, “Un extrait 
de la Hidāya d’Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī”, p. 286, §67): “al-kasb innamā yufāriqu 
al-ḍarūrī bi-wuǧūd al-qudra ʿalayhi wa-kawn man wuǧida bihi qādiran ʿalayhi 
wa-muḫtāran lahu”. 
16 JAN THIELE 
according to my choice. Although I am not the producer of this act in 
the Ašʿarite view, I still have decided to move intentionally, unlike 
when shivering from fever, about which I have no choice at all. Al-
Bāqillānī’s preference for the notion of choice might look like only a 
minor and arbitrary modification, unless we consider some further 
explanations, which help us to understand why he avoided the notion of 
the will that al-Ašʿarī had still used in the Lumaʿ. 
Al-Bāqillānī belonged to a generation of Ašʿarites that made 
significant contributions to the consolidation of the school’s teaching.46 
The permanent challenge by rival systems of thought certainly raised 
the theologians’ concern to achieve greater consistency in their 
doctrines. One result of the ongoing attempts at systematisation was 
that, against al-Ašʿarī’s original suggestion, the conceptualisation of the 
will was not – or no longer – compatible with the notion of kasb. 
Accordingly, al-Bāqillānī rejects – first in the Tamhīd and later in the 
Hidāya – the notion that whether or not we “acquire” an act actually 
depends on our will being involved.47 One explanation for this claim is 
al-Bāqillānī’s view that the will itself is an “acquired” act. 48  Little 
imagination is therefore needed to anticipate the almost inescapable 
objection that if the “acquisition” of an act of will requires another act 
of will, this would lead to the unacceptable claim of an infinite chain of 
acts of will. 
 
46 Al-Bāqillānī’s central role in the history of Ašʿarism was highlighted as early as 
at the beginnings of Ašʿarite studies in the nineteenth century: since then, 
scholars repeatedly relied on Ibn Ḫaldūn’s (d. 808/1406) famous account on the 
evolution of Ašʿarite kalām, which is found in his Muqaddima (see, for example, 
Martin Schreiner, “Zur Geschichte des Aśʿaritenthums”, in Actes du 8e Congrès 
International des Orientalistes (Leiden, 1893), pp. 79–117, pp. 81–3). Ibn 
Ḫaldūn attributes to al-Bāqillānī a number of revisions of earlier Ašʿarite 
doctrines. As we know today, the examples provided by Ibn Ḫaldūn – al-
Bāqillānī’s teaching on atoms, void and the fact that accidents need a substrate – 
are in fact positions that were already held by al-Ašʿarī himself (see Richard J. 
McCarthy’s article “al-Bāḳillānī” in EI2, and for more detailed discussions 
Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 35–63 (on atoms), pp. 63–5 (on void), pp. 75–97 (on 
accidents) as well as Richard M. Frank, “The Ašʿarite ontology: I primary 
entities”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 9 (1999): 163–231; in addition, 
Ayman Shihadeh, “The argument from ignorance and its critics in medieval 
Arabic thought‘, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 23 (2013): 171–220, pp. 217–
20 showed that Ibn Ḫaldūn’s presentation of al-Bāqillānī’s teaching on rational 
proofs is imprecise). Surprisingly, Ibn Ḫaldūn is, however, silent on such 
original positions as al-Bāqillānī’s abovementioned adaption of the concept of 
ḥāl or the developments of the theory of kasb discussed in this article. 
47 See al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, p. 286, §486 and al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 
112b (edited in Gimaret, “Un extrait de la Hidāya d’Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī”, 
p. 286, §67). 
48 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 9b. 
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But al-Bāqillānī makes an additional point, which is based on his 
reflections on how the human will relates to reality. Our will (and 
similarly aversion), he argues, does not necessarily relate to the 
possible or to possible “acquisitions” (mā yaṣiḥḥu ḥudūṯuhu aw 
ḥudūṯuhu wa-iktisābuhu) but in some cases to the impossible (mā 
yastaḥīlu). Suppose somebody wants to perform – or, to keep the 
Ašʿarite terminology, to “acquire” – an impossible act. His will is then 
based on his conviction (iʿtiqād) and assumption (ẓann) that the 
actually impossible act is possible. This conviction or assumption is, 
however, not knowledge (ʿilm), since real knowledge only encompasses 
that which is actually true (ṣaḥīḥan ḥā[diṯan]). In contrast, convictions 
and assumptions can be wrong and consequently extend to the 
impossible. Indeed, the upshot of these premises is that whenever we 
know that something is impossible, we cannot will it (istaḥāla taʿalluq 
al-irāda wa-al-karāha bi-mā yuʿlamu al-ʿālim istiḥālat ḥudūṯihi). But 
as long as we do not know, but only assume that an act is possible, the 
act we want to perform is by definition not an object of knowledge 
(maʿlūm), and so may consequently be impossible.49 
Accordingly, al-Bāqillānī denies that our will accounts for how, or 
even necessitates that, we “acquire” acts (laysat bi-ʿilla li-wuǧūdihi wa-
lā sabab mūǧib lahu). And because we sometimes fail to exercise our 
will, he says, there can only be one possible conclusion: the non-
occurrence of an act we want at a given moment can only be explained 
by a lack of power (ʿadam al-fiʿl maʿ al-irāda dalīl ʿalā anna man lam 
yaqaʿ minhu ġayr qādir ʿalayhi).50 
As previously outlined, al-Bāqillānī’s recourse to the notion of 
“power” (qudra) in the context of “acquisitions” was, in itself, not a 
new idea: al-Ašʿarī had already used it to distinguish between 
“necessary” and “acquired” acts. However, al-Ašʿarī’s conception of 
human power remained obscure in various respects. Before I turn my 
attention to al-Bāqillānī’s approach to these unresolved questions, it is 
worth pointing out first that his conception of the human qudra is built 
on the major tenets established by the school’s founder. 
There are essentially three features of human power by which al-
Ašʿarī sharply distinguished his conception from that of the 
Muʿtazilites. For al-Ašʿarī’s opponents, man’s power must already exist 
before he acts. Otherwise, they argued, we would act out of necessity 
and not contingently as they claimed. Al-Ašʿarī, in contrast, posited 
that man has power only simultaneously with his act. While the 
 
49 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 10b–11b. 
50 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn, MS Tashkent, al-Biruni Institute of 
Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 3296, fol. 
6a. 
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Muʿtazilite principle of freedom of action implied that man’s power 
enables him to two contrary acts or to an act and omission, al-Ašʿarī 
denied this doctrine. For him, human power only relates to a single act. 
Finally, al-Ašʿarī rejected the Muʿtazilite idea that human power can 
continue to exist for several instants of time. 
Al-Bāqillānī agrees with al-Ašʿarī on each of these issues. He even 
presents many identical arguments to support these claims, first in the 
Tamhīd and later in the Hidāya. Against the Muʿtazilite thesis that man 
must be capable of action before he acts, al-Bāqillānī replies that we 
then have to concede the possibility of actions being done by 
incapables (ʿāǧiz) who lost their capacities at the moment they act.51 If 
man had simultaneous power over two alternative acts, this would not 
only pose the logical problem that two opposed acts would necessarily 
happen at the same time: both contraries would even occur in the same 
substrate, which, al-Bāqillānī says, is inconceivable. 52  Finally, he 
rejects the continued existence (baqāʾ) of human power on the basis of 
the Ašʿarites’ categorical denial that accidents (aʿrāḍ) exist longer than 
one instant of time.53 
For a better understanding of how al-Bāqillānī attempted to solve 
some of the above-mentioned questions raised by al-Ašʿarī’s theory, we 
have to ask about the function of human power within the framework 
of his theory of acts. While al-Bāqillānī’s Tamhīd does not offer any 
further reflections on this question, he seeks to address it in the Hidāya. 
In a passage of this text, which defends the claim that man’s power and 
his action must be simultaneous, al-Bāqillānī posits that the occurrence 
of acts depends on the existence of power (yaḥtāǧu al-fiʿl fī wuqūʿihi 
wa-wuǧūdihi ilā wuǧūd al-qudra ʿalayhi). This dependence is 
described by al-Bāqillānī as being analogous to the dependence 
between a predicate (ḥukm) and the ground (ʿilla) on account of which 
a predication is made or said to be true. In contrast to the relation 
between ʿilla and ḥukm, however, it is not man’s power which 
necessitates his acts (al-qudra ġayr mūǧiba; lā yaḥtāǧu [al-fiʿl] ilayhi 
[=ilā wuǧūd al-qudra] li-yūǧada).54 
 
51 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 143a; al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, p. 287, §488; for 
al-Ašʿarī’s original argument see Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 137–8, based on al-
Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §§ 123–124. 
52 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 143b–144a; for al-Ašʿarī’s identical objection 
see Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 137, 145 based on al-Ašʿarī, Lumaʿ, §§ 126–127. 
53 It was argued that, otherwise, accidents would never cease to exist and their 
contraries could not possibly come into existence (al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, 
fol. 145a); also see for al-Ašʿarī’s view Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 90, 133; Frank, 
“The Ašʿarite ontology”, p. 197. 
54 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Tashkent, fol. 1b. 
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But if our actions do not occur by virtue of our power, how can it be 
true that man’s acts depend on his power? Al-Bāqillānī’s answer to this 
apparent contradiction was to claim that denying that our power causes 
the existence of acts does not prevent it from affecting our acting in 
some other way. Accordingly, he argued that the human power of 
“acquisition” actually has an effect (taʾṯīr). While al-Ašʿarī himself 
does not even use the term taʾṯīr in relation to man’s power in his 
extant writings, some later Ašʿarites report that he completely rejected 
the idea of any such effectiveness. 55  According to al-Šahrastānī (d. 
548/1153), this position was only later revised by al-Bāqillānī. He is 
said to have formulated the theory that acts are qualified by a property 
or attribute whenever their performance is conjoined by the existence 
of power in the agent. 56  Al-Bāqillānī’s conceptualisation of the 
effectiveness of human power was, however, more complex, if not 
ambivalent. In the Hidāya he suggests three approaches to 
understanding how power affects our acting. One of them proposes that 
the agent himself is affected, while the two others attempt to examine 
the correlation between agents and their acts. 
Al-Bāqillānī first takes into consideration how agents themselves are 
affected by their qudra. He departs from the notorious scenario on 
which the distinction between “necessary” and all other acts is based. 
As we have seen, this distinction was commonly used by Ašʿarites to 
prove that whenever we act necessarily, we do not possess the power by 
virtue of which we describe agents of “acquired” acts as powerful 
(qādir). Now al-Bāqillānī developed a different conception than al-
Ašʿarī of that which is expressed, or referred to, by such affirmations as 
“he is powerful”. For al-Ašʿarī, this predication only refers to the 
existence of the qudra, that is an entity conceptualised as an accident 
(ʿaraḍ) that inheres in the agent. In contrast, al-Bāqillānī says in the 
Hidāya that such predications as “being powerful” refer to a real 
feature – a ḥāl (“state”) in the technical language – of the subject 
described as powerful. For him, the ḥāl of “being powerful” (kawnuhu 
qādiran) and the existence of power (qudra) are not identical but 
reciprocally entail each other: the existence of power is evidenced 
 
55 Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, pp. 88–90. This account by al-Šahrastānī, 
which was also later adopted by Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī and others, is, 
however, challenged by Ibn Fūrak in his Muǧarrad maqālāt al-Ašʿarī, ed. Daniel 
Gimaret (Beirut, 1987), pp. 92–3; see Gimaret, Doctrine, p. 392. 
56 Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, pp. 92–3 (relying on Muḥammad b. ʿAbd 
al-Karīm al-Šahrastānī, al-Milal wa-al-niḥal = Books of Religious and 
Philosophical Sects, ed. William Cureton, 2 vols. (London, 1842–1846), vol. I, 
pp. 69–70 and Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Šahrastānī, Nihāyat al-aqdām fī 
ʿilm al-kalām, ed. Alfred Guillaume (London, 1934), pp. 72–6, 87); see also 
below. 
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(madlūl) by the ḥāl, which, in turn, is grounded in, and becomes actual 
by virtue of, the existence of power.57 It is precisely in this sense that 
al-Bāqillānī describes the effectiveness of human power in relation to 
the agent himself: whenever man performs an acquired act, the qudra is 
the ground for a ḥāl or attribute (ṣifa) of “being powerful” and thus for 
a qualification that distinguishes him from compelled agents (taʾṯīruhā 
kawn al-qādir bihā qādiran ʿalā an yataḥarraka wa-yaskuna wa-yurīda 
wa-yanẓura wa-yaʿlima wa-yafkira. fa-yakūnu bi-kawnihi qādiran ʿalā 
ḥāl man lahu hāḏihi al-ṣifāt mufāriqan li-ḥāl al-muḍṭarr allaḏī laysa bi-
q[ā]dir ʿalā an yataḥarraka wa-yaskuna wa-yurīda wa-yaʿlima).58 
 
57 The notion of ḥāl was introduced into the conceptual framework of kalām by 
Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī. Al-Bāqillānī’s position on this concept was not 
consistent. In the Tamhīd, he devotes a whole chapter to refuting it (al-Bāqillānī, 
Tamhīd, pp. 200–3, §§339–344). Later, however, in the Hidāya, he borrowed 
and adapted the concept, primarily to prove the existence of entitative attributes 
in God. In accordance with Abū Hāšim, al-Bāqillānī assigned to the ḥāl a reality 
that cannot be described by the dichotomy of existence and non-existence (al-
Bāqillānī, Hidāyat al-mustaršidīn, MS St Petersburg, The Institute of Oriental 
Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences, C329, fol. 35a). His idea of 
the reciprocal correlation between a ḥāl and its entitative ground is well 
summarised in the following passage: “the knower’s being knowing entails the 
existence of entitative knowledge (kawn al-ʿālim ʿāliman yaqtaḍī wuǧūd al-ʿilm) 
and the existence of entitative knowledge entails his being knowing. […] The 
existence of entitative knowledge entails the knower’s being knowing in the 
sense that it is the ground (ʿilla) that accounts for his being knowing […]. The 
knower’s being knowing does not necessitate entitative knowledge (lā yaqtaḍī 
wuǧūb al-ʿilm), because ‘his being knowing’ refers to a ḥāl of [the knower], and 
the general consensus is that the aḥwāl do not necessitate entities. [However], it 
is possible to say that the knower’s being knowing entails the existence of 
entitative knowledge in the sense of the ‘evidence for that which is evidenced’ 
(ʿalā maʿnā iqtiḍāʾ al-dalāla li-al-madlūl), since the existence of knowledge is 
evidenced by [the knower’s being knowing] […].” (al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS 
St Petersburg, fol. 62b). I will be further exploring al-Bāqillānī’s notion of ḥāl in 
a forthcoming publication; for some preliminary observations based on al-
Bāqillānī’s Hidāya see Jan Thiele, “Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī’s (d. 321/933) theory 
of ‘states’ (aḥwāl) and its adaption by Ashʿarite theologians”, in Sabine 
Schmidtke (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology (Oxford, 2016), 
pp. 364–83, pp. 377–82. 
58 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 152b; see also fol. 146b where al-
Bāqillānī describes the entity of power as the ground (ʿilla) for the agent’s 
“being powerful”: “hāḏihi ʿilla […] li-annahu innamā yaḥtāǧu al-qudra li-
yakūna al-qādir bihā qādiran”. Obviously, al-Bāqillānī posited that compelled 
agents are qualified by a ḥāl of being “powerless” (ʿāǧiz), which is opposed 
(mutaḍādda) to that of the “powerful”. This can be deduced from a passage from 
the section on attributes (Kitāb al-Ṣifāt) in the Hidāya, where a detractor argues 
that only entities (ḏawāt) can be opposed to each other; in this context, he refers 
to the opposition between the ḥāl of the “powerful” and the “powerless” that al-
Bāqillānī affirms; see al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS St Petersburg, fol. 99a–b. 
 CONCEPTIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION 21 
This conception of the effectiveness of human power, however, does 
not account for why acts should be considered as ours. The proponents 
of human freedom of action, in contrast, provided a rather simple 
solution to this question: for them, our acts only occur by virtue of our 
power. They consequently argued that we are responsible for our acts 
because their occurrence is causally connected to us. From his Ašʿarite 
perspective, al-Bāqillānī found this explanation unacceptable, since for 
him it violates the claim of God being the all-encompassing Creator. He 
therefore rejects the notion that our acts are brought into existence by 
virtue of our power, however not at the cost of denying any relation 
(taʿalluq) between our power and our acts. 
The concept of taʿalluq was frequently used in the terminology of 
kalām. Both Ašʿarite and Muʿtazilite theologians applied the notion of 
correlation to a number of properties or attributes (ṣifāt) and also to 
accidents (aʿrāḍ) in which these properties are grounded. 59  More 
precisely, the term was employed whenever the subject qualified by 
such a property is in some way related to another object or a target: 
assumptions or statements are made about something, and we perceive 
objects distinct from ourselves by sensual perception. The kalām 
theologians therefore reasoned that our making assumptions or 
statements and our perception imply a correlation with something else. 
As explained by al-Bāqillānī, the extent of that which relates to a 
particular property completely depends on the property in question. For 
example, an assumption (ẓann) is not based on sufficient evidence for 
being qualified as knowledge (ʿilm). While real knowledge implies that 
that which is known is true, assumptions can be wrong. As a logical 
corollary, that which we assume to be true may in fact not be real, and 
so al-Bāqillānī concludes that that which relates to assumptions is much 
more wide-ranging (awsaʿ, aʿamm) than that which can be known: 
unlike knowledge, that necessarily relates to the known as it really is 
(lā yataʿallaqu bi-al-maʿlūm illā ʿalā mā huwa bihi), we may also 
assume that something is other than it really is (ʿalā mā huwa bihi 
tāratan wa-ʿalā mā laysa bihi uḫrā).60 The range of possible objects of 
perception is, in turn, even more restricted, since we can only perceive 
 
59 Al-Bāqillānī refers to these properties as al-ṣifāt allatī lahā taʿalluq (al-
Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 7a); in the section on attributes (Kitāb al-ṣifāt) of 
the Hidāya, he also refers to knowledge, power and the will as examples for a 
class of accidents that relate to something else (ǧins mā lahu taʿalluq min al-
aʿrāḍ ka-al-ʿulūm wa-al-qudar wa-al-irādāt; see al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS 
St Petersburg, fol. 135b). For a comprehensive Baṣran Muʿtazilite account of 
correlations established by accidents see Ibn Mattawayh, Taḏkira, vol. I, pp. 6–8. 
60 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 7a–8b. 
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specific things that actually exist (al-idrāk fa-innahu lā yataʿallaqu illā 
bi-kāʾin mawǧūd).61 
With regard to human power, al-Bāqillānī claims that, in principle, 
our qudra may relate to whatever can be created and “acquired” 
(tataʿallaqu bi-mā yaṣiḥḥu an yuḥdaṯa wa-yaṣiḥḥu [an] yuktasaba), 
further specifying that this excludes the eternally and the continuously 
existent (lā yaǧūzu taʿalluquhā bi-al-qadīm wa-bi-al-bāqī) – that is 
God and atoms – or two contraries (al-ḍiddayn) at the same time. 
Therefore, any considerations about how power affects our acting 
merely applies to actions of our limbs or mental acts (afʿāl al-ǧawāriḥ 
wa-al-qulūb), including motion, rest, acts of will and knowledge. In 
order to do justice to man’s inability to create what he “acquires”, al-
Bāqillānī adds the remark that the performance of such acts involves 
two powers, each of which relates to a given act in different respects 
(yataʿallaqu bihi qudratān ʿalā waǧhayn muḫtalifayn): God’s power 
accounts for its creation (iḫtirāʿ) and man’s power for its 
“acquisition”.62 
According to al-Bāqillānī, man’s power must be suitable (ṣāliḥa) for 
a specific act, and there can only be a correlation on condition that we 
have power when our act comes into existence.63 However, whenever 
these conditions are fulfilled, our power – or our “being powerful” – 
necessarily relates to the “acquired” act. Otherwise, al-Bāqillānī argues, 
acts performed by a powerful, a sick person and a powerless were 
alike.64 As for the question about the precise nature of the relationship 
between man’s power and his acquired acts, al-Bāqillānī provides two 
possible solutions. 
In the first of his two approaches, al-Bāqillānī argues that positing 
the effectiveness (taʾṯīr) of human power does not necessarily imply 
the meaning that man’s “acquired” acts are created and exist (iḥdāṯuhu 
wa-wuǧūduhu) by virtue of his power. Nor does it mean that the 
coming into existence of such acts entails that they come to have an 
attribute by virtue of man’s power (taǧaddud [MS: taǧdīd] ṣifa tatbaʿu 
ḥudūṯahu wa-wuǧūdahu ṣāra al-muktasab ʿalayhā bi-al-qudra). Rather, 
al-Bāqillānī illustrates his view by drawing a parallel with the relation 
between knowledge and the known or sensual perception and the object 
 
61 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 11b. 
62 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 9a–b. 
63 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Tashkent, fol. 15b: “fa-in kānat [al-istiṭāʿa] ṣāliḥa li-
[al-fiʿl] fī ḥāl wuqūʿihi wa-kawnihi mafʿūlan bihā, waǧaba kawnuhā qudratan 
ʿalāyhi fī tilka al-ḥāl wa-mutaʿallaqa bihi, wa-ḏālika mā naqūlu”. 
64 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 114a (= Gimaret, “Un extrait de la Hidāya 
d’Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī”, p. 286, §71): “wa-law lam yakun li-kawnihi kasban 
taʿalluq bi-kawn al-muktasib qādiran, la-istawat fī ḏālika ḥāl al-qādir wa-ḥāl al-
marīḍ wa-al-ʿāǧiz, wa-ḏālika mimmā qad ʿulima buṭlānuhu fa-ṯabata mā 
qulnāhu”. 
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perceived. Both have a real and knowable correlation with a specific 
object, even though knowledge and perception do not cause their 
objects to exist or to possess an attribute. Al-Bāqillānī concludes that it 
is precisely in this sense that the relation between man’s power and his 
“acquired” act should be understood (ǧārin maǧrā […] fī taʿalluq al-
ʿilm bi-al-maʿlūm wa-al-idrāk bi-al-mudrak fī annahu taʿalluq ṯābit 
maʿlūm maḫṣūṣ fa-in lam yakun maʿnāhu wa-taʾṯīruhu fī ǧaʿl al-
maʿlūm wa-al-mudrak mawǧūdan aw ḥādiṯan aw ʿalā ṣifa tatbaʿu al-
ḥudūṯ wa-ka-ḏālika al-qudra mutaʿalliqa bi-al-maqdūr taʿalluq maʿlūm 
maḫṣūṣ wa-in lam yakun maʿnāhu wa-taʾṯīruhu ǧaʿl al-maqdūr 
mawǧūdan aw ḥādiṯan bihi wa-ǧaʿlahu ʿalā ṣifa tābiʿa li-ḥudūṯihi).65 
Yet al-Bāqillānī’s first response to the question how acts created by 
God are related to their human agents does not resolve the more 
fundamental issue, namely that of our individual moral responsibility. 
For the Muʿtazlites, we are accountable for what we do and fail to do 
because the creation and omission of our acts is determined by our very 
own selves. Accordingly, they argued that the Ašʿarite theory of action 
makes nonsense of morality. How could it be true that we are rightly 
and fairly praised and blamed for acts if it is not us who create them? 
And would not God oblige man beyond his capacities and unjustly 
reward and punish him for what is actually divinely created?66 
To answer this problem, al-Bāqillānī develops a different 
understanding of what is specifically subject to moral assessment in our 
acting. His solution is found in his second approach to conceptualising 
how man’s created power affects, and relates to, his acts. Surprisingly, 
al-Bāqillānī appears, however, to contradict himself when he addresses 
the question of our individual moral responsibility: despite his previous 
denial, he now affirms that the human act comes to have an attribute on 
account of man’s created power. As he further explains, it is to this very 
attribute that God’s command, prohibition, promise, threat, praise, 
blame, compensation and punishment relate (maʿnā taʿalluq al-qudra 
al-ḥādiṯa bi-maqdūrihā wa-taʾṯīrihā fīhi an yasīra [MS: taṣīra] bihā 
ʿalā ṣifa tābiʿa li-ḥudūṯihi wa-bi-tilka al-ṣifa yataʿallaqu al-amr wa-al-
nahy wa-al-waʿd wa-al-waʿīd wa-al-madḥ wa-al-ḏamm wa-al-ṯawāb 
wa-al-ʿiqāb).67 
 
65 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 153a–b. Al-Ǧuwaynī later formulated a 
similar position in his Iršād (ed. Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-
Munʿim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd [Cairo, 1369/1950], p. 210); he denies, however, that the 
correlation between qudra and maqdūr implies any effectiveness of man’s power 
on his “acquired” acts (see Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, pp. 121–2). 
66 The argument is further developed in Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, 
pp. 252–5. 
67 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 154a. 
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Al-Bāqillānī’s line of argumentation is consequently based on the 
assumption that individual moral responsibility does not mean that man 
is accountable for the very existence of his acts. He thereby neutralizes 
a central argument of the proponents of freedom of action. In affirming 
that “acquired” acts come to have an attribute by virtue of man’s power, 
al-Bāqillānī then provides a second major component in his attempt to 
reconcile moral responsibility with divine determinism. Appealing to 
this attribute, al-Bāqillānī could argue that a real feature of “acquired” 
acts is determined by man’s very own self although he does not create 
them. In line with the argument that compelled agents have no power, 
he could furthermore argue that it is precisely this attribute that 
distinguishes “acquired” from “necessary” acts.68 
The idea that acquired acts come to have an attribute by the effect of 
human power was already discussed in Gimaret’s seminal Théories de 
l’acte humain en théologie musulmane. The earliest evidence for this 
thesis he was able to consult was an account found in Abū Ǧaʿfar al-
Simnānī’s (d. 444/1052) al-Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-īmān. In this work al-
Simnānī posits that whenever we “acquire” actions, their coming into 
being is accompanied by an attribute that relates to man’s power and 
will. This attribute is subject to God’s command and prohibition, praise 
and blame. Al-Simnānī was al-Bāqillānī’s student, but he nowhere 
credits these assumptions to his teacher. Gimaret could only suppose on 
the basis of later reports that this was also al-Bāqillānī’s position.69 
These later sources include most importantly the works of al-
Šahrastānī. He attributes to al-Bāqillānī the thesis that God creates our 
acts – say an act of moving – and leaves us control over the precise 
modalities (wuǧūh) of our acting. That is, whenever we “acquire” a 
movement created by God, we determine by our own self whether it is 
rising, sitting down, praying, etc.70 Yet the passages from the Hidāya 
 
68 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 142b: “[al-ʿabd] innamā yaḥtāǧu ilā [al-
qudra] li-yaṣīra al-kasb bihā ʿalā ṣifa tufāriqu ṣifat al-iḍṭirār.” 
69 Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain, pp. 101–3. Recently, the Bayān was 
published and the relevant passage is found in Abū Ǧaʿfar Muḥammad b. Aḥmad 
b. Muḥammad al-Simnānī, al-Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-īmān wa-al-kašf ʿan tamwīhāt 
ahl al-ṭuġyān, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Rašīd al-Ayyūb (Kuwait, 1435/2014), pp. 
243–4. 
70 Al-Šahrastānī also denotes the “modalities” of man’s acting as “a ḥāl that is 
supplemental to existence” (ḥāl zāʾida ʿalā al-wuǧūd) and “rational points of 
view” (iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya). In his accounts it is not always clear whether al-
Šahrastānī provides a paraphrase or his own interpretation of al-Bāqillānī’s 
teaching. The relevant texts (al-Šahrastānī, Milal, vol. I, pp. 97–8 and al-
Šahrastānī, Nihāya, pp. 73–5) were analysed by Harry Austryn Wolfson, The 
Philosophy of Kalam (Harvard, 1976), pp. 692–3, Gimaret, Théories de l’acte 
humain, pp. 104–15 (including French translations of the texts) and Ahmed 
Alami, “L’ašʿarisme face à la théorie des modes”, Philosophie, 77 (2003): 45–
68, pp. 52–7. 
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examined above confirm what Gimaret already suspected: that al-
Šahrastānī does not reproduce al-Bāqillānī’s original theory but rather 
adapts it to his own understanding of human agency. 
The chapter on human “power of acquisition”, which is found in the 
Hidāya, does not end with a conclusion. This opens some room for 
speculation as to which of the three solutions al-Bāqillānī ultimately 
considered the appropriate answer to the problem of how our power 
affects our acting. Even if al-Bāqillānī’s first answer does not 
necessarily conflict with the two others, the second and the third 
answer appear to be inconsistent, if not contradictory, and therefore 
demand some further clarification. A possible explanation of the 
problem could be that al-Bāqillānī only distinguished the three levels of 
effectiveness of human power from a logical point of view: the first 
level would then concern the agent himself in that he acts intentionally 
by virtue of his power of “acquisition”, the second level of 
effectiveness would connect him with his act, and the third would affect 
the act inasmuch as it is distinguished by some property from 
“necessary” acts. 
A fragment of a sentence, which, due to manuscript damage, is 
decontextualized, seems to favour a different interpretation, however: it 
rather suggests that, according al-Bāqillānī, either of these three 
modalities excludes the two others. 71  It seems, however, that the 
discussion of the three options is not meant to test out alternative 
hypotheses, of which only one can be confirmed while the two others 
have to be rejected categorically. Instead, al-Bāqillānī apparently 
supposes that, depending on some circumstances, human power is 
effective in any of the described ways. This understanding is confirmed 
by a passage from the section on God’s attributes (Kitāb al-Ṣifāt) 
contained in the Hidāya, which explains possible meanings of the 
effectiveness of power (qudra): 
Power (al-qudra) either relates [a] to the creation of an entity (maʿnā) or [b] to the 
“acquisition” [of this entity] in that [power] relates to the entity whilst it exists or [c] in 
that [the entity] comes to have an attribute that accompanies its coming into 
existence.72 
From al-Bāqillānī’s perspective, only God has power to create things 
(and, consequently, His power alone can relate to their creation); 
 
71 See al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS Fes, fol. 152b: “[…] qudratuhu bi-iḥdāṯihi waǧaba 
an yuqāla inna maʿnā taʾṯīrihā wa-taʿalluqihā bi-maqdūrihā aḥad ṯalāṯat awǧuh 
minhā annahu laysa taʾṯīruhā wuǧūb wuǧūd al-maqdūr wa-ḥudūṯ[ihi] bihā wa-
lā ǧaʿluhu ʿalā ṣifa tarǧiʿu ilā nafsihi wa-ǧinsihi aw ṣifa tatbaʿu ḥudūṯahu aw 
annahu kāʾin bihā ʿalā baʿḍ ḥaqāʾiqihi.” 
72 Al-Bāqillānī, Hidāya, MS St Petersburg, fol. 150b: “al-qudra innamā tataʿallaqu 
bi-iḥdāṯ maʿnā aw bi-iktisābihi bi-an tataʿallaqa bihi wa-huwa mawǧūd aw bi-
an yaṣīra bihā ʿalā ṣifa tatbaʿu al-ḥudūṯ”. 
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therefore, only the second and the third modality described in this 
quotation are relevant to human acts, as is also underlined by the use of 
the term “acquisition”. These two modalities can be easily identified 
with the second and the third explanation of the effectiveness of human 
power as discussed in the chapter on human “acquisitions”. Since they 
are presented here as real alternatives, al-Bāqillānī must have assumed 
that human power can be effective in more than one way. This largely 
answers the question how to understand al-Bāqillānī’s contradictory 
affirmations – that human power relates to an act without causing it to 
have an attribute (second answer) and that “acquired” acts come to 
have an attribute by virtue of man’s power (third answer): both 
scenarios are possible options, which we can only assume occur under 
different circumstances. In the extant parts of the Hidāya, I cannot find, 
however, any solution for the question what precisely determines which 
of the possible alternatives will happen. 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Muʿtazilite and Ašʿarite theologians used to explain the link between 
human actions and moral responsibility in terms of man’s capability or 
power (qudra). According to the Muʿtazilites, we are free agents by 
virtue of this very capability. It enables us to act otherwise than we do, 
but it in no way necessitates any action. Whether or not we act and 
whatever we do is completely up to us. Within the school, it was 
however debated whether our power over alternative acts is sufficient 
for us to control what we do, or whether our decision-making requires 
something else: some Muʿtazilites argued that exercising freedom 
depends on intentions or motivations in order to turn our abilities into 
real actions. 
For al-Ašʿarī, human acts that occur on account of man’s power are 
voluntary acts. Man does not create his actions, but his acting is self-
determined because he does things according to his willing and 
wanting. Yet it appears that al-Ašʿarī believed that human capability or 
power has no effect whatsoever. This raised the question of the function 
of human power. It would seem that al-Bāqillānī attempted to solve the 
problem when he drew on al-Ašʿarī’s theory: where the latter speaks of 
mere conjunction between man’s power and his act, al-Bāqillānī speaks 
of correlation. For him, human agents who are held responsible for 
what they do have a real property or attribute on account of their qudra. 
It is by virtue of this specific feature that they are distinguished from 
whoever is powerless (ʿāǧiz) and therefore irresponsible for actions he 
cannot refrain from performing. In addition, al-Bāqillānī suggests that 
man is related to his acts by virtue of his power, even though he does 
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not create them. Consequently, man cannot be praised and blamed for 
the existence of his actions. Al-Bāqillānī therefore concludes that man 
assumes the responsibility for something else: he argues that God’s 
command and prohibition relate to an attribute of acts that is caused by 
human power. 
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